UNITED STATES
PRC
EUROPEAN UNION
JAPAN / KOREA
INDIA
IRAN / GULF
ROC
PANAMA
RUSSIA
TÜRKIYE
ASEAN
GLOBAL TRADE

TIER ONE
STRAIT OF HORMUZ
STRAIT OF TAIWAN
PANAMA CANAL
STRAIT OF MALACCA
BAB-EL-MANDEB
TIER TWO
MOZAMBIQUE CHANNEL

International Chokepoint Authority

Beyond Bilateralism: A Pragmatic Framework for Integrated Governance of Global Chokepoints

An Independent Analysis

Muri Veteres

June 2026

Internet Archive

International Chokepoint Authority

Beyond Bilateralism: A Pragmatic Framework for Integrated Governance of Global Chokepoints

A Muri Veteres™ Independent Analysis — June 2026

PREAMBLE

On August 6, 1945, a single weapon destroyed a city. The United Nations was chartered two months earlier and ratified in the weapon's aftermath — the most concentrated demonstration in human history of what organized systems produce when resource and ideological competition reaches its terminal gradient. The organization was designed to prevent recurrence. It does not address the dynamics that make recurrence possible.

Eight decades later, those dynamics operate simultaneously across multiple high-pressure resource competition axes, managed by the same frameworks that have failed to address their underlying condition since the charter was signed. The legal frameworks are rigorous. The diplomatic conventions are sincere. The collective security architecture is substantial. None operates where the problem actually lives.

The problem lives at the resource layer. States are dissipative entities — organized systems that persist by securing continuous access to the resources that sustain their complexity. They do not subordinate that imperative to shared values, juridical equality, or humanistic appeal, because the imperative is structural. It operates beneath every formulation the United Nations has produced.

The most compressed expressions of that imperative pass through a small number of geographic chokepoints. No permanent governance architecture exists for any of them. That absence is not an oversight. It is the condition the imperative produces and maintains.

The International Chokepoint Authority (ICA) proposes to change that condition directly. Not with a moral appeal — the atomic bomb made the moral case in 1945 and it has not proved sufficient — but with a pragmatic framework that changes what resource competition produces.

THE PRECEDENT

The ICA does not propose an untested logic. It extends one already in operation.

On March 14, 2026, the International Strait Authority (ISA) was filed as a formal governance proposal for the Strait of Hormuz — the first permanent administrative framework ever proposed for that chokepoint, submitted during an active closure crisis and before any competing framework existed in public discussion. Four supplemental updates tracked the crisis through its successive phases. The proposal was transmitted to the relevant audience. The stalemate that followed was not an obstacle to the correct solution. It was its most precise argument.

The ISA's governing logic was precise: make the cost of challenging the strait's permanent administration higher than the cost of accepting it, for every actor simultaneously. Not by resolving the navigational regime dispute that had persisted without legal resolution since the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Not by building superior military capability against Iran's layered asymmetric defense architecture. By converting unilateral resource control into a multilateral utility in which every dependent actor — energy producers, energy consumers, transit states, and Iran itself — held a direct financial stake in the strait's continued function. The resource imperative is not overcome. It is redirected.

The ISA demonstrated that a permanent governance instrument for a major international chokepoint is architecturally conceivable, analytically rigorous, and politically available. The ICA extends that demonstration to the full geography of compressed resource competition — chokepoints extant worldwide.

THE ARCHITECTURE

The ICA governs through a two-tier framework calibrated to the nature and intensity of each chokepoint's resource compression and governance deficit.

Tier One: Full Governance Architecture

Five chokepoints present the combination of global resource dependency, absent or inadequate permanent governance, and active or latent conflict pressure that requires full administrative architecture rather than incremental diplomacy.

The Strait of Hormuz — through which approximately twenty percent of the world's daily oil supply transits — is the founding case. The ISA proposal established the governance logic. The 2026 closure crisis demonstrated its necessity. The legal regime remains unresolved between the two primary non-UNCLOS parties. The military deterrence posture is resource-intensive and credibility-dependent. The ISA instrument converts the contest into a utility. It remains available.

The Taiwan Strait presents the same logic at higher complexity. Three simultaneous gradients — a sovereignty claim unresolved since 1949, the world's most advanced semiconductor fabrication capacity, and the central node of the First Island Chain — make Taiwan the most overdetermined chokepoint in the international system. No single governance instrument addresses all three. The ICA framework proposes a multilateral utility encompassing both the manufactured resource and the geographic passage, in which every dependent economy — extending well beyond the Pacific Rim to all powers whose technological infrastructure depends on microprocessor access — holds a direct financial stake in Taiwan's continued function. The sovereignty question is not resolved. It is superseded.

The Panama Canal presents an immediate and developing gradient. The People's Republic of China's infrastructure presence through Hutchison Whampoa, the United States' reassertion of strategic interest, and the canal's foundational role in trans-oceanic trade constitute a three-way compression that existing governance frameworks — the 1977 Torrijos-Carter Treaties, Panamanian sovereignty, the residual American strategic claim — do not adequately address. The ICA offers a multilateral utility framework that distributes the canal's administration across its dependent actors, accommodating rather than displacing Panamanian sovereignty, and removing the canal from bilateral contest.

The Strait of Malacca carries a specific and documented vulnerability for the ICA's most resistant potential member. The PRC's acute dependency on Malacca passage is so strategically significant that Beijing has explicitly named it "the Malacca dilemma" and spent two decades constructing overland alternatives to reduce it. It is a passage China cannot control unilaterally, through which the majority of its energy imports

and export trade must move. That vulnerability is the precise gradient that makes Chinese ICA participation rational. The ICA does not threaten the Malacca passage. It secures it — for China as much as for any other dependent actor.

The Bab-el-Mandeb — the southern entrance to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal route — is currently under active interdiction pressure from non-state actors. The Houthi interdiction campaign has demonstrated that a chokepoint need not be contested between states to generate global resource disruption. The ICA's governance architecture encompasses non-state threat actors as a category, not an exception.

Tier Two: Collective Security Framework

A second tier of chokepoints presents governance deficits addressable through coordinated multilateral security architecture rather than full administrative governance. The Mozambique Channel, the Sulu-Celebes corridor, and analogous passages subject to piracy and non-state armed group pressure constitute environments in which ICA collective security membership provides enforcement coordination that no bilateral arrangement has achieved. Smaller maritime nations acquire a participation role that does not require primary stakeholder status in Tier One disputes.

The Turkish Straits present a distinct gradient. The Montreux Convention provides an existing but contested administrative framework — Türkiye exercises sovereign administration with demonstrated willingness to interpret its provisions selectively. The ICA relationship to Montreux is one of alignment and enhancement rather than replacement, preserving Türkiye's administrative role within a broader collective security architecture.

The Suez Canal requires specific acknowledgment. Unlike the five Tier One chokepoints, the canal operates under full Egyptian sovereign administration established by nationalization in 1956 and enshrined in constitutional law. The Constantinople Convention of 1888 provides an existing multilateral navigation framework. The ICA does not propose to govern what is already governed, nor to displace sovereign administration with multilateral oversight — the error of the Suez Canal Users Association in 1956, which failed precisely because it attempted to override a legitimate sovereign claim. Where the ICA engages Egypt is through the Bab-el-Mandeb, whose Tier One governance directly affects Suez Canal traffic volumes and whose interdiction has already demonstrated the operational

inseparability of the two passages. The ICA accommodates Egyptian sovereignty. It secures the passage that Egyptian sovereignty depends on.

The asymmetry — sovereign administrators receiving collective security benefit without surrendering administrative control — is consistent with the ICA's treatment of Panama and Türkiye. It is the accommodation that makes participation rational rather than threatening.

The Upstream Gradient

The rare earth monopoly is China's Hormuz. As Iran controlled the physical closure of an energy chokepoint, China controls the material substrate of the global semiconductor industry — approximately sixty percent of rare earth mining and a significantly higher share of processing capacity. The weapon can be wielded selectively, withheld strategically, and deployed as leverage against any dependent economy. A governance framework that secures the finished resource while leaving the material supply chain as unilateral leverage does not eliminate the compression point. It relocates it.

The ICA does not ask China to forfeit the rare earth position. It offers something the position cannot provide on its own: sustainability.

The rare earth monopoly is a depreciating asset. Geographic diversification of rare earth mining is underway in Australia, Canada, and the United States. Processing capacity outside China is minimal today, but will not remain so. The window during which control of rare earth mining and refining functions as uncontested leverage is finite — and China knows the horizon better than any other actor.

The ICA offer follows the ISA's governing logic, as established in The Precedent: convert a depreciating unilateral leverage position into a permanent multilateral stake. A China that holds a governance role in the ICA's semiconductor utility does not lose the rare earth position. It exchanges a weapon with a finite horizon for a permanent institutional stake in the resource architecture that the weapon currently threatens. The threat dissolves. The stake remains.

A China that waits — deploying the rare earth position as leverage while diversification proceeds — arrives at the governance table on less favorable terms, with less leverage to trade, negotiating from a position the ICA will have already defined without it.

The offer is not idealistic. It is thermodynamic. Early adoption is worth more than resistance.

Supply chain diversification — like manufacturing diversification — is a necessary and ongoing parallel track. Neither operates on the timeline the current strategic environment requires. The governance architecture must function in the world as it is.

The relationship between rare earth supply chain governance and the architecture of permanent semiconductor stability is the subject of a future independent proposal.

THE STAKEHOLDER MATRIX

The matrix that follows maps eight chokepoints against twelve stakeholder categories across five gradient designations: high stake, moderate stake, contested or resistant, collective security, and absent. It is not a diplomatic document. It is a resource calculus — a rendering of what each actor stands to lose from disruption, gain from governance, or preserve through resistance.

Three observations govern its reading.

First: contested cells are not empty cells. An actor with structural incentive to resist governance architecture while retaining unilateral leverage is a stakeholder in the most consequential sense. Resistance is a position, not an absence. The ICA's governing logic — converting unilateral leverage into multilateral stake — operates precisely at the contested gradient. Iran at Hormuz. The PRC at Taiwan and Panama. Russia at the Turkish Straits. Each contested cell is the architecture's primary argument, not its primary obstacle.

Second: the matrix reads horizontally as a chokepoint profile and vertically as a stakeholder profile. Read horizontally, the Strait of Malacca presents the most uniformly high-stake row in the Tier One architecture — the chokepoint at which the widest range of actors share an unambiguous dependency. Read vertically, the PRC presents the most complex stakeholder column — high stake at Hormuz and Malacca, contested at Taiwan and Panama, with the rare earth position operating as an upstream gradient that does not appear in any cell but conditions every one.

Third: Global Trade is not a stakeholder in the diplomatic sense. It is the aggregate consequence column — the measure of what every disruption costs the system as a

whole, regardless of which actor initiates it. Its consistent high stake across every Tier One chokepoint is the ICA's most compressed argument: the system cannot afford what it has not yet governed.

Exhibit A: Stakeholder Matrix: See Last Page

THE CASE

The architecture proposed here is unprecedented in scope. It is not unprecedented in logic. The logic was established at Hormuz, stress-tested against a century of operational failure and legal ambiguity, transmitted to the relevant audience. The stalemate that followed was not an obstacle to the correct solution. It was its most precise argument.

The ICA extends that argument to the full geography of compressed resource competition. Five primary chokepoints through which the majority of global energy supply, semiconductor production, and trans-oceanic trade must pass — none permanently governed, each a recurring site of the same sequence: diagnosis and analysis followed by institutional inability to act against the gradient. The pattern is what the system produces and maintains.

Three simultaneous high-pressure resource competition axes — Hormuz, Taiwan, Ukraine — are currently degrading the same Western institutional capacity that each would require in isolation. The system maintaining multiple equilibria simultaneously does not fail. It thins until the threshold is reached at which deterrence loses credibility — and the next crisis arrives under conditions the prior settlement did not resolve.

The atomic event established the terminal cost of allowing that dynamic to proceed without adequate governance. The United Nations was founded on that lesson and has proved inadequate. The ICA does not replace the United Nations. It operates at the gradient beneath the humanistic construct, where the competition that produces the symptoms actually lives.

The ICA does not propose its own implementation. The sequence by which sovereign actors adopt, adapt, or resist this architecture is the work of politics. The work of this proposal is to ensure the architecture exists, is available, and is on the record before the next crisis confirms what the current ones have promised.

Governance architectures of this kind have never been adopted in anticipation of crises. They have been adopted, when adopted at all, in their immediate aftermath.

The architecture's most persistent obstacle is not political in the conventional sense. It is thermodynamic. The Reflexive — the contraction of organized systems toward immediate resource imperatives as the terminal cost of near-apocalypse recedes from institutional memory — produces two distinct and predictable outcomes that push back against integrated governance in every generation: the concentration of power as sovereign authority, and the withdrawal from systemic commitment. Neither contests the architecture directly. One has something to lose from it. The other has forgotten what it stands to gain. Both are what the forgetting produces. The ICA is filed in the interval between forgettings.

The moral case was apocalyptically made in 1945. It has been nearly forgotten.

This architecture is the pragmatic case. It is on the record.

ISA Corpus timestamps: Original proposal March 14, 2026 · First update March 21, 2026 · Second update March 27, 2026 · Third update April 8, 2026 · Fourth update May 12, 2026. All documents publicly available at the Internet Archive: https://archive.org/details/Proposal_Permanent_Governance_Strait-of-Hormuz

Exhibit A: Stakeholder Matrix

MURI VETERES · INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS · JUNE 2026

International Chokepoint Authority
Stakeholder Matrix

Resource interests, conflict gradients, and governance stakes across primary and collective security chokepoints

High stake · Moderate stake · Contested / resistant · Collective security · Absent / minimal

Chokepoint	United States	PRC	EU	Japan / Korea	India	Iran / Gulf	ROC	Panama	Russia	Türkiye	ASEAN	Global Trade
Tier One — Full Governance Architecture												
Strait of Hormuz *Energy · Active crisis · ISA precedent* PRIMARY	H	H	H	H	H	C	–	–	M	M	M	H
Strait of Taiwan *Semiconductor · Geography · Sovereignty* PRIMARY	H	C	H	H	M	–	H	–	M	–	H	H
Panama Canal *Trade · PRC infrastructure · US reassertion · Sovereignty* PRIMARY	H	C	H	H	M	–	–	H	M	–	M	H
Strait of Malacca *Trade · PRC Malacca dilemma · Piracy* PRIMARY	H	H	M	H	H	–	–	–	–	–	H	H
Bab-el-Mandeb *Energy transit · Houthi interdiction · Piracy* PRIMARY	H	H	H	H	H	C	–	–	M	–	M	H
Tier Two — Collective Security Framework												
Mozambique Channel *Emerging · Piracy · African trade routes* COLLECTIVE	CS	M	CS	M	H	–	–	–	–	–	–	M
Sulu–Celebes Sea *Piracy · Non-state actors · Pacific access* COLLECTIVE	CS	M	–	H	M	–	–	–	–	–	H	M
Turkish Straits *Black Sea access · Montreux Convention · Türkiye sovereign* COLLECTIVE	CS	M	H	–	–	–	–	–	C	H	–	M

Contested cells
Indicate actors with structural incentive to resist governance architecture while retaining unilateral leverage. Resistance is itself a stakeholder position.

PRC at Taiwan
Contested reflects sovereignty claim and leverage interest. ISA logic proposes redirection: partial availability without force as the counter-offer.

Panama sovereignty
High stake reflects sovereign administrative role under Torrijos-Carter Treaties. ICA framework must accommodate rather than displace Panamanian sovereignty.

Russia at Turkish Straits
Contested reflects Black Sea access dependency and Montreux wartime provisions applied against Russian naval movement during the Ukraine conflict.

Malacca motivation
PRC high stake reflects the documented Malacca dilemma — acute dependency on a passage China cannot control unilaterally. Primary ICA participation motivator.

Rare earth substrate
Taiwan semiconductor dependency extends upstream to rare earth supply chains, approximately 60% PRC-controlled. China's Hormuz. Subject of a future independent proposal.

Suez Canal
Sovereign administration established 1956, constitutionally enshrined. Constantinople Convention (1888) provides existing navigation framework. Omitted from governance matrix — not a vacancy.